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Abstract 
The case of SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) has generated a 
heated discussion between the European Parliament, the Council, and the Commission concerning the 
data exchange via bank transfers between the EU and the US. However, although the case had attracted 
opponents and critics from within the European Parliament in discussions about both security policy 
and citizen rights since the disclosure of the SWIFT service in 2006, the issue became most salient in 
the European quality press at the time when the European legislature rejected an interim agreement in 
February 2010. The paper investigates the variation of media coverage over time by drawing on a 
comprehensive content analysis of quality newspapers in six EU countries as well as on interviews with 
the respective correspondents in Brussels. It argues that the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty is 
responsible for the Parliament’s greater visibility in the press – it gave the institution the power to veto 
the agreement. Yet, the study not only discovers variation over time but also across countries which is 
being related to the role of the national parliaments in the SWIFT debate suggesting some form of 
rivalry in the mediated public sphere exemplified by the German case. Despite being a single yet 
crucial case study, it has positive implications for the democratic deficit debate. Since the media hold 
the important function of transmitting news and information to Europe’s citizens their reportage could 
potentially lead to more public awareness of the EU and its representative body in the post-Lisbon era. 
 
 





The European Parliament (EP) is nowadays a powerful institutional player at the 
European Union level. With the Lisbon Treaty having expanded once more the 
competences of the legislature and manifested its rights to scrutinise the European 
executive, the European Parliament’s significance is comparable to that of the US 
Congress leaving its national counterparts behind in vibrant EU politics (Hix, 2009). 
Under the ordinary legislative procedure, the Council of Ministers and the Parliament 
decide co-equally in most social and economic policy areas and many more. At the 
same time, the EP has become more confident in controlling the European 
Commission by means of the investiture procedure exemplified in the election of the 
two recent Commissions under Barroso in 2004 and 2009. This increase in power 
implies that public awareness has also risen accordingly since some proposals to 
tackle the European democratic deficit comprise the strengthening of the European 
Parliament (Williams, 1991). That is to say, the more relevant and powerful the 
representative body at the EU level, supposedly the better do citizens understand and 
deliberate EU politics via the electoral connection. In fact, despite low turnout levels, 
the media reportage of European election campaigns has supposedly increased across 
the EU over time (de Vreese, Banducci, Semetko, & Boomgaarden, 2006). The paper, 
however, seeks to assess whether the European media follow the actual decision-
making power of the European Parliament over the years – by devoting more 
attention to the legislative body in between electoral campaigns.  
In order to answer this question, the paper conducts a study of a most-likely case, 
namely the SWIFT case, later called SWIFT agreement. SWIFT stands for the Society 
for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication which provides a worldwide 
financial messaging service from its headquarters in La Hulpe, just outside Brussels. 
After the terrorist attacks in 2001, the United States (US) Treasury gained access to 
the transfer data in order to receive information about international money trans-
actions as part of their Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP). European data 
also fall under the TFTP, but the data exchange only became public in June 2006. 
While data protectionists and the European Parliament immediately raised their 
concern about privacy, the European Union did not have a legal base to intervene or 
participate. When SWIFT moved its server from Virginia to Switzerland in 2010, the 
European governments expressed their interest in maintaining the data exchange to 
combat terrorism which consequently required an international agreement. Although 
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the EU and the US signed an interim accord on 30 November 2009, the Parliament, 
having gained the right to give its consent to international agreements with the Lisbon 
Treaty a day later (Art. 188 N) insisted to be consulted. The European Commission 
tried to act as a mediator, but the EP rejected the accord on 11 February 2010 on the 
grounds of civil rights and data protection which inevitably led to a compromise 
between the institutional actors involved. It was finally ratified by the EP on 8 July 
that year.  
Methodologically, the paper relies on a quantitative content analysis of 455 
broadsheet articles published between 1 June 2006 and 30 November 2010 in six EU 
countries – Ireland, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Germany, and 
Austria – as well as on qualitative interviews conducted with the respective 
correspondents in Brussels in June 2010.1 Both multivariate regressions and the 
interviewee’s reports serve to explain the news coverage of the EP with respect to its 
conduct in the SWIFT case. The paper finds that the respective reportage has 
increased significantly after the Lisbon Treaty. When the EP made use of its new 
powers to reject the agreement, the media expressed far more interest. Yet, the study 
not only discovers variation over time but also across countries. Explanations for this 
are related to the importance of the SWIFT debate in the national context: the more 
national parliaments are (capable to become) involved, the slightly lower the EP 
coverage suggesting a publicly perceived rivalry between the parliamentary 
institutions exemplified by the German case. Nevertheless, the regressions also reveal 
that EP debates themselves are a significant driver of the news about SWIFT. Despite 
being a highly salient issue, correspondents underline that the rise in media attention 
towards the EP and its members (MEPs) is not only linked to this particular decision 
but derives from the new competences with effect of the Lisbon Treaty providing an 
optimistic outlook for the media representations of the EP’s influence in other 
policies. This has positive implications for the democratic deficit debate. Since the 
media hold the important function of transmitting news and information to Europe’s 
citizens their reportage could potentially lead to more public awareness of the EU and 
its representative body. 
                                                 
1
 The data is available through the author. 
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The paper proceeds by providing a brief overview of the research on EU news and 
their production in relation to the European Parliament before presenting the research 
design and operationalization of the variables. The third section analyses the findings 
followed by a brief conclusion summarising the main implications of the research 
conducted in this paper.  
 
The European Parliament and EU news production  
The European Parliament’s increase in both legislative and parliamentary powers over 
the last couple of decades has come along with a rising research interest of political 
scientists in this particular institution. The scholarly focus thus far has shed light onto 
the comprehension of its institutional development within the EU political system 
over time. Yet, the EU representative body has seldom been subject of 
communication research in the European context (but see Anderson & McLeod, 2004; 
Baisnée, 2003; Morgan, 1999). In fact, most media studies only indirectly deal with 
the EP by examining the phenomenon of European elections. These have various 
purposes including the investigation of variation in news coverage and content across 
country and over time (e.g. de Vreese, et al., 2006) as well as the analysis of possible 
effects on voting behaviour (e.g. de Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2006; Norris, 2000). In a 
wider context, a handful of studies have also sought to explain why and how some 
news about the EU, its actors and policy decisions are being published in a certain 
way and not in another (e.g. de Vreese, 2003; Kevin, 2003; Statham, 2006) putting the 
newsmakers on location at the core. These are helpful when investigating the 
determinants of news about the European Parliament. Correspondents are actually 
said to have socialised with the particular Brussels beat by “going native” with the 
European Union elites (Morgan, 1995). Yet, they still perform a role of transmitting 
news from the EU to the national audiences (cf. Baisnée, 2004) by producing news for 
national media that employs them and deliver these through “national prisms” 
(Preston & Horgan, 2006). In the following, the application of news values will be 
analysed expected to have an influence on the EP reportage over time. The second 
part of the section looks at possible explanations for cross-country variation.   
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Since news can be understood as a product or service for a consumer by a provider 
principally interested in profit, newsmakers are dependent on the demand competing 
with other news (cf. McManus, 1994). ‘If they do not cater well for that audience their 
very survival is at stake’ (Negrine, 1996: 101). That is to say, in the case of 
newspapers, journalists orientate themselves at the readers’ interest being controlled 
by the editor (in the home office) who acts as a gatekeeper between the news producer 
and the recipient (de Vreese, 2003). A reliable and established measure of the 
audience’s concern is the application of news values. While Galtung and Ruge (1965) 
classify conflict as the main news selection criterion for journalists, Shoemaker and 
Reese (1996: 111) compile a list of several applicable characteristics able to increase 
the consumer’s attention: prominence/importance, human interest, conflict/contro-
versy, the unusual, timeliness and proximity.  
Not all of which are relevant for the news coverage of the European Parliament. 
Notably, importance is the central news value when determining whether the 
extended institutional powers of the EP lead to greater media attention. Put 
differently, as the legislative powers of the EP grew in a wide range of policy areas 
over the years, especially since the introduction of the co-decision procedure with the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1993, this particular news value is expected to have become 
more relevant contributing positively to the selection of news about the EP. In the 
case of the SWIFT, given that the EP received the right to formally approve 
international agreements with the Lisbon Treaty, importance is expected to be a 
decisive factor that boosts the media coverage significantly after 1 December 2009. 
Before that date, the European Parliament’s legislative powers were restricted to 
fewer policy areas, which supposedly affected the overall perceived relevance of the 
institution itself. Morgan (1999) finds that in 1996 – i.e. before the Treaty of 
Amsterdam had been introduced and with it Co-decision II granting the European 
Parliament co-equal legislative powers shared with the Council (e.g. Tsebelis, 2002: 
264) – the overall media attention paid to the EP was rather low in his country 
selection of the UK, Ireland and Belgium. A finding which is, however, still in line 
with those by Koopmans (2007) who states legislative and party actors at both 
national and EU level would generally be represented to a much lesser extent in the 
media than core state actors. This could be due to the news value of prominence, or 
what Luhmann (1996: 66) calls personification. It helps selling stories if the 
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readership has a ‘face’ in mind to (re-)identify actors, e.g. from the national context, 
to be linked to actions and policy decisions. The fact that MEPs are less well-known 
in public is supposedly linked to the weak electoral connection to their voters (cf. Hix 
& Hagemann, 2009). Yet, Europe’s legislators have become increasingly career-
oriented (Scarrow, 1997). On a highly salient issue like SWIFT they are therefore 
expected to actively seek media attention assuming that their main goal is to become 
re-elected or considered for another office (cf. Downs, 1957). This phenomenon 
might also contribute to the variation in coverage across country, since MEPs are 
elected on a national basis. 
Anderson and McLeod (2004), furthermore, find obstacles for media reporting in the 
Parliament’s own instruments of public relations. MEPs, as well as the EP press 
directorates, and the regional offices would not provide sufficient support for the 
journalists to cover the European Parliament, their members and the affected 
decisions adequately. Baisnee (2003) derives a lack of interest per se in the EP by the 
EU press corps exemplified by the changing numbers of journalistic staff registered 
with the institution over time. While reportedly partly due to the diverging journalistic 
cultures originating in the home country, other reasons would largely lie in the 
character of the institution itself. The nature of plenary debates is not considered 
supportive for media attention. Although the European parliamentary parties have 
become increasingly cohesive along ideological lines (Hix, Noury, & Roland, 2007) 
allowing for sincere political battles as opposed to mere clashes between different 
nationalities, due to the absence of a common work language, legislative debates 
appear to be rather technical predominantly serving voting procedures while lacking 
heated discussions and lively engagement by the members of the European Parliament 
(Shephard & Scully, 2002). This diminishes the potential for political contestation to 
be a crucial factor for newsmakers to decide whether to report from the EP or not. 
Occasional muscle flexing as in the case of the Santer Commission which stepped 
down after a threat of a no-confidence vote by Parliament in March 1999, however, 
has made the news value of conflict applicable for several times in the past. The 
prospective for contestation has supposedly also increased with the extension of 
parliament’s legislative rights, allowing for clashes between the EU institutions over 
policy decisions. Again, in the SWIFT case, the Parliament’s decision to reject the 
agreement on financial data exchange in February 2010 caused conflict both at the 
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European level as well as in the EU relationship with the United States which in turn 
provided reasons to report more comprehensively about the EP’s position. 
For journalists and correspondents writing about foreign affairs, and European politics 
in particular, the news value domesticity becomes important – understood as relevance 
of news for a domestic context (cf. Gleissner & de Vreese, 2005; Hafez, 2007; 
Hannerz, 2004; Kevin, 2003) which is closely related to Shoemaker and Reese’s 
criterion of proximity. Morgan’s study (1999) of the EP media coverage finds 
variation in tone towards the EU institution in the media suggesting this particular 
news value to be a relevant condition. According to Morgan, possible explanations 
comprise differing historic developments in each country, divergent electoral systems 
and benefiting positions in the EU alongside public support for EU membership. 
Consequently, variation in the domestic political culture should be reflected in the 
news coverage about the EP. The salience of the SWIFT case supposedly varies per se 
across countries given that the issue is divisive between the improvement of security 
standards to fight international terrorism and civil liberties in terms of ensuring data 
protection. For instance, after the terrorist attacks in London in July 2005, British 
citizens are expected to be more lenient to improve security standards at the expense 
of some privacy rights. An alternative example is the national public outrage in 2009 
when Google announced to introduce its ‘Street View’ in Germany by publishing 
photographs of streets and buildings on the internet. Hence, despite the increase in EP 
powers, some variation in the coverage can still be expected across country.   
With respect to the EP’s role, the paper proposes another explanation for such a 
variation. It derives from the fact that correspondents, when reporting about the EU, 
have to consider that their audience might only have little knowledge ‘since most 
national political systems differ from the EU system, it is problematic for the 
journalists to cover issues adequately. Often they see themselves simply to approach a 
topic from the basics.’ (Gleissner and de Vreese, 2005:  229). These ‘basics’ 
supposedly represent experiences in the national context with which EU citizens are 
more familiar – an assumption which builds on Schmidt (2006) who argues that 
national conceptions of democracy and political institutions would still prevail in the 
heads of citizens despite on-going Europeanization processes. Specifically, Goetze 
and Rittberger (2010: 51) propose that the EP derives its legitimacy from existing 
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practices with parliamentarism at the national level since ‘a high degree of legitimacy 
of existing practices and procedures makes it increasingly difficult to conceive of 
alternative modes of democratically legitimizing the EU ‘off the beaten track’.’ Given 
that parliamentary systems vary across the EU, it can be assumed that the expectations 
towards the European Parliament differ as well which is reflected accordingly in the 
news coverage. That is to say that in the case of SWIFT, the European Parliament, 
once powerful after Lisbon, should receive more attention in countries where the 
national parliament is also an influential legislator measured by the strength vis-à-vis 
the executive since the reader is familiar with the level of parliamentary influence 
when salient political decisions are being taken. In countries where the executive is a 
powerful agenda setter facing rather weak parliaments, such as in Ireland, the UK and 
in France, the coverage about the EP’s involvement in the SWIFT negotiations is 
therefore expected to be significantly lower than in the remaining member states 
which are characterised by stronger legislatures (cf. Tsebelis, 2002). 
In sum, while the European Parliament’s overall media coverage is assumed to have 
increased in the case of SWIFT over time due to the application of news values, 
especially those of importance and conflict, country variation might be explained by 
the respective national interest in the SWIFT debate and role of the national 
parliament in the domestic decision-making context.  
 
Research design and operationalization 
The research conducted for this paper is part of a larger PhD project examining the 
determinants of media representations of the European Parliament. Table 1 provides 
an overview of the data considered for this study. Quality newspapers serve as a 
reliable source of news about the EP since their journalists act as opinion leaders in 
their national context and thus might perceive it as their duty to report frequently 
about the EP which provides a sufficient supply of news for analysis (cf. Bijsmans & 
Altides, 2007; d’Haenens, 2005). At the same time, cross-media fluctuation is largely 
being controlled for.  
[Table 1 about here] 
9 
 
The core dataset comprises 288 articles published in three different types of 
broadsheets (left-oriented, right-oriented and business focussed) in six EU countries – 
Ireland, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Germany and Austria – 
between 1 June 2006 and 30 November 2010. These articles all refer to both SWIFT 
and the European Parliament comprising news, comments, and interviews in national 
editions.2 Items from newswires have been excluded.3 Additionally, the second part of 
the data comprises 167 articles which mention SWIFT in relation to other European 
and/or national actors, but not to the EP. This means that the total selection represents 
all articles published on SWIFT in the respective newspaper selection. Thus, the main 
dependent variable – percentage of words dealing with the EP within each news item 
– ranges from 0 to 100 (see Table 2).  
Table 1 already demonstrates the large variation across country with the German 
broadsheets, led by the Handelsblatt, contributing the largest amount of relevant 
articles for the analysis (137 plus 73). The Irish, followed by the British and Dutch 
newspapers, publish the least amount of articles in this respect. The next table 
provides the descriptive statistics for the dependent variable for each country 
considering the total case selection. Accordingly, the Irish articles internally focus the 
least on the EP, closely followed by the German broadsheet news, while the internal 
share in the French press is largest with an average of approximately 30%.  
[Table 2 about here] 
The prospective regression analysis does not rely on Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
models but uses Tobit models instead. That way one can account for biased variation 
caused by the large proportion of zero observations (167) in the otherwise continuous 
dependent variable. The standard errors are being adjusted by newspaper, describing 
17 clusters as the Sunday Business Post is missing in the sample. The Tobit 
coefficients can be interpreted in a similar way as those of OLS models. Yet, the latter 
ones are also provided in appendix producing similar results and a sufficiently large R 
squared.  
                                                 
2
 For the Financial Times only articles published for the London edition have been considered, despite 
the large amount of relevant articles published for a European, US or Asian audience.  
3
 Note that the Sunday Business Post has been considered, but it did not publish any article on SWIFT 
and the EP during that period. Its online archives and those of the Irish Examiner are currently under 
re-construction. A thorough follow-up search of articles published on SWIFT only before September 
2007 has yet to be conducted. 
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The set of independent variables, which orientate themselves at publication dates, 
country, or newspaper, first and foremost includes a dummy variable for the Lisbon 
Treaty. Another time dummy measures whether the EP has debated the SWIFT issue 
on a given day of publication or the day before. Both these variables measure 
importance. Since the dates of the article publications hardly match with the sitting 
days of national parliaments debating the same issue – which is an interesting finding 
on its own but rather relevant for an investigation of media attention devoted to 
national parliaments – a continuous variable has been included that summarises the 
sitting days per country ranging from 0 in the case of Ireland to 22 for the German 
Bundestag (see Appendix). The baseline model comprises the political affiliation of 
the broadsheets included in this study, their circulation numbers and page size. 
Further controlling variables are the dummy describing whether a country held the EU 
Presidency at a given date conditioning a more EU-attentive national media and 
continuous variables of public opinion, namely trust in the national parliament, and 
support for EU membership building on Morgan’s (1999) assumptions. The latter has 
been considered elsewhere as well, without producing a significant effect on the 
amount of EU coverage in television news (Peter & de Vreese, 2004).4 The respective 
descriptive statistics and correlations can be found in the appendix.  
The interviews with the correspondents serve to further explain the findings from the 
statistical analysis increasing both the validity and reliability of the results. While the 
focus here is on the European Parliament, previous studies provide important 
information about the general work experience of correspondents in Brussels. 
Relevant here are the ones examining the restraints the journalists on location receive 
during the news production process (cf. de Vreese, 2003; Gavin, 2001; Kevin, 2003; 
Morgan, 1995) which particularly concern their relationship to the editor and access 
to sources. Table 1 includes the number of respondents per newspaper.5 In total, 17 
reporters have been questioned in either German or English in the form of semi-
structured interviews lasting in between 25 and 70 minutes. Most of the interviewees 
                                                 
4
 Note that the inclusion of country dummies lead to multicollinearity. All models have been run 
omitting countries one by one and the main independent variables remain significant except for the 
German exclusion, which will be explained below. The results can be obtained from the author. The 
appendix also shows that the number of correspondents correlates highly and significantly so with 
some main independent variables. Controlling for time does not make sense given that some days have 
several observations, while for several months there have been no observations at all.  
5
 For the purpose of anonymity, in the remainder of the paper the correspondents are being referred to 
as IRE-1, IRE-2, UK-1, etc. The order does not result from the table.  
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were men (15), and only two female. Importantly, this quasi-fieldwork has been 
conducted in June 2010, i.e. before the European Parliament officially ratified the 
agreement on 8 July, when the three institutions were still debating, mostly 
informally, the new terms and conditions. Correspondents were highly attentive to the 
on-goings at that time being an ‘over-informed social group which is aware of every 
single (political) fact that happens in the EU political world’ (Baisnée, 2002: 110). 
The qualitative results therefore exhibit a degree of uncertainty regarding the outcome 
of the institutional battle and, rather than reflecting purely retrospectively on the issue, 
feature active experiences and topical attitudes. 
 
Findings 
Following up the previous work of correspondent’s professional experience, the 
journalists interviewed for this study mostly claim that they are rather autonomous in 
Brussels. Especially the ones writing for the large broadsheets are granted a lot of 
space, in some cases given ‘special pages’ (NL-2) by their editor back home for their 
‘daily reportage’ from the EU (GER-3). Yet, the editors are sometimes hard to 
convince as some ‘often think the Parliament is a sort of talking shop’ (GER-2). 
Austrian and Irish newspapers would be more restricted to space, and for the British 
interviewees, the editor has a more central role, especially since ‘the sense is that a lot 
of people in the UK are hostile to Europe, just not interested’ (UK-3). This could be 
an explanation why the British sample is rather small in this study – yet does not 
explain why the Austrians, which are also known for being rather hostile towards the 
EU, distribute more news on the EP in relation to SWIFT (see Table 1).  
Regarding access to sources and information and contrary to some allegations (e.g. 
Anderson & McLeod, 2004), correspondents state the European Parliaments and its 
members would be very accessible nowadays. In fact, ‘their communications has 
improved out of all recognition’ as observed by an Irish correspondent who has 
followed the parliamentary business in Brussels and Strasbourg for a long time (IRE-
1). MEPs would be, furthermore, ‘extremely interested’ (GER-3) to become cited in 
the national press, which can be explained by rational choice theory for the purpose of 
reputation and re-election. Additionally, ‘they [the Parliament’s administration] have 
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improved their website a lot, and the press people are very responsive’ (UK-3). Given 
that their work is public and becomes important for the media by providing ‘a 
platform for debate and influence’ (GER-4), this might be not surprising. Gleissner 
and de Vreese (2005) have previously ascertained that the EP would be very 
transparent, as opposed to the meetings of the Council allowing ‘no transparency’, or 
the Commission which is ‘very technical’ in its communication (FRA-1). These are 
positive conditions for media reportage about the European Parliament. It remains to 
be seen, however, whether accessibility alone renders the institution a newsworthy 
institution; especially when in Brussels the European Parliament would ‘compete’ 
(IRE-2) with all other kinds of actors, institutions and events going on at the same 
time. 
The remainder of the section firstly describes the amount of coverage the EP received 
when it dealt with SWIFT over time. These findings are nourished by the comments 
of the correspondents. Subsequently, the variation in reportage across country is being 
examined producing rather unexpected results which are being elaborated.  
 
Power as a determinant of EP media attention  
The SWIFT issue became the SWIFT agreement only on 30 November 2009 when 
the European governments decided to sign a deal with the US over the data exchange 
of personal information provided via bank transfers. This was one day before the 
Lisbon Treaty came into force, granting the EP with more comprehensive rights, such 
as the consent to international agreements. The European Parliament, by raising 
privacy concerns, debated the matter already in June 2006 when it became public that 
US authorities had had access to the data via the SWIFT server. At that time it did not 
even have co-decision rights in the field of Freedom, Security and Justice. Yet, it 
immediately tabled a resolution on 6 July 2006 called ‘Interception of bank transfer 
data from the SWIFT system by the US secret services’ followed by a second one on 
14 February 2007 criticising both the Passenger Name Record (PNR) and SWIFT.6 In 
                                                 
6
 The PNR is closely related to the latter issue as it concerns the provision of personal data of airline 
passengers to US authorities. 
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both these resolutions, the EP explicitly demanded the respect of data protection 
rights.  
In the following months, it got rather quiet around the SWIFT case, and the 
Parliament’s statements did not seem to have any public effects. The media coverage 
in that regard was almost non-existent, despite the fact that the EP issued eight other 
resolutions which also mentioned SWIFT, though primarily dealt with other concerns. 
One of them was on the role of the European Central Bank requesting the institution 
to act as an overseer of the data exchange under SWIFT on 12 July 2007. Figure 1 
demonstrates the media coverage of the EP’s engagement with SWIFT. There was no 
reportage in 2008 at all. As seen in the picture, the Parliament issued another 
resolution on 17 September 2009 dedicated to SWIFT only, reiterating its calls for the 
consideration of EU citizens’ data protection in the preparation of an international 
agreement. But it was not until the official enactment of the Lisbon Treaty, that the 
Parliament received more media attention.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
As the picture shows, in December 2009, the press started debating the stance of the 
EP in the negotiations. ‘We saw it coming late December’, states one correspondent 
referring to the No-vote of the Parliament in February 2010, since it eventually has 
got ‘powers since the 1st of December [2009]’ (FRA-1). That month also 
demonstrates the most significant peak of the media coverage. In fact, most of the 
other interviewees did not regard the rejection as imminent. ‘We did write a bit [about 
the Parliament’s position on SWIFT], commented on that […] we actually thought the 
item would go through’ (GER-3). In 2009 still, it was also not clear that the EP 
received the possibility to vote on the issue so soon which was due to enter into force 
on 1 February 2010. Hence, ‘it was on news value surprise’ (UK-1) and newsworthy 
because ‘the European Parliament for the very first time and deliberately overrode an 
international agreement and the European Commission’ (GER-1) on 11 February 
2010. That is to say, that the powers of the EP at this point were actually highly 
decisive news factors. It was the first noteworthy decision the Parliament has taken 
since the expansion of its legislative rights with the Lisbon Treaty. In fact, ‘it could 
have been anything, but they [the parliamentarians] are using it to show that you have 
to listen to them’ (UK-2). And indeed, the correspondents interviewed here notice that 
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there has been a change affecting the decision-making of the European Parliament 
stating that ‘before it was largely a talking shop’ (IRE-1). But Lisbon would have 
been the ‘turning point’ (UK-3).  
Clearly, this shows that the news value of importance applies here, as far as the 
SWIFT issue is concerned. In fact, it has become particularly interesting for the 
journalists as ‘the EP is also getting involved in international affairs for the first time’ 
(UK-1). Put differently, when the Parliament did not have any powers in this area 
which combines international security concerns with data protection, the media 
attention it received was rather meagre as exemplified in Figure 1. ‘The ordinary day-
to-day business of legislation, of passing legislation, is significantly more procedural, 
process-oriented – [generating] no dramatic stories, [especially] when there is 
something else going on.’ (IRE-2) However, when the MEPs attained the 
competences by the Lisbon Treaty to influence the outcome by rejecting the interim 
agreement and requesting amendments to be made in order to approve it, the 
Parliament finally became important, i.e. newsworthy, enough as an institution to be 
reported comprehensively in the European quality press: ‘it matters more so it gets 
more coverage’ (UK-2). In that sense, its newsworthiness would comply with the 
general rules of thumb: 
‘It’s the same like everywhere in the world. If the Parliament is 
involved in the decisions, and if that is of general interest, or if 
makes itself visible by being particularly stupid, then it gets 
reported’ (GER-5) 
That is to say, the while the change after Lisbon might have been swift causing a 
sudden rise in media reportage, the attention the EP receives is not only tied to its 
powers per se, but issue-dependent. ‘The topic is always decisive [for news 
reporting].’ (AT-1) The case of SWIFT itself is loaded with highly salient news 
values as it ‘is about privacy and direct consequences’ (NL-2). In that sense, the issue 
would be an ‘easy story to report as it relates to everybody, everybody understands’ 
(IRE-1). That is where the news factor of proximity comes into play. The other highly 
relevant factor, which is here closely linked to importance, is that of conflict. But 




‘SWIFT is a civil liberty problem, but wouldn’t have been vetoed 
without the Conservatives. They felt: We are the liberal Europeans 
together with the other groups. In a normal parliament that would 
be red against blue or whatever, but on such a fundamental issue, 
they tend to stick together. It has a different dynamic, which makes 
it interesting. SWIFT was a total surprise for the Council and the 
Commission.’ (FRA-1) 
That is to say that the institutional contestation gave the issue a different light when 
‘Parliament [was] flexing its new muscles’ (IRE-2). As one correspondent puts it: 
‘Just the fact the EP takes a decision, doesn’t mean I write about it […] I get 
interested when the institutional balance between the Council and the EP is changing’ 
(NL-2). In the eyes of the experts in Brussels, the European Parliament with the 
rejection of the SWIFT agreement demonstrated to the Council that ‘we have arrived 
and you have to deal with us’ (IRE-1). For a German correspondent it was 
furthermore a struggle ‘against the Commission and the Americans’ (GER-2). Many 
therefore claim the visit by Joe Biden, the US Vice President, would have been 
interesting. He came to Strasbourg on 6 May 2010 to lobby the Parliament to accept 
the agreement at the next vote in favour of combating terrorism. However, the actual 
press coverage does not often refer to this event. Furthermore, sometimes, 
institutional battles are also subject to criticism when the European Parliament rebels 
as a whole against the Council:  
‘I find that ridiculous and it has nothing to do with the voter 
mandate […] Some decisions are not necessarily better when taken 
against the will of the Council […] You and I as citizens have the 
right that decisions are being taken according to objective criteria 
and not whether the Parliament wants to prove its strength and feels 
treated on its toes.’ (GER-5) 
Yet, another respondent claims that it would be a ‘good thing, if it [the Parliament] is 
acting like a political institution – in the past, it was more like a decision-making 
machine’ (NL-2). Hence, at the time of the interview, everyone was looking edgily 
forward to the second vote on 8 July 2010 and not certain about how the outcome 
would look like. Figure 1 shows another increase in press coverage just before that. 
Having been questioned exactly at this point in time, correspondents have expressed 
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mixed feelings when evaluating the EP’s behaviour on SWIFT. The critics do not 
have a positive word to say about the legislative body in that affair. One states:  
‘I hope for every EU parliamentarian who voted against it, that there 
will never be a terrorist attack which can be traced back to that 
[decision]. Everyone wanted the data exchange, but the EP has 
delayed it.’ (AT-1)  
Put bluntly, if there is no data exchange in the future, ‘then there is no added value of 
the Parliament’ (GER-5). However, another one is disappointed about the EP’s 
position for different reasons: 
It got strengthened by the Lisbon Treaty but it is not yet comparable 
to the Bundestag or the lower house in London or the like. It will 
give in in the end. Frankly, the parliamentarians always prance 
tremendously before the press. But if you look at the outcome at the 
end, there is nothing much left of it. […] Just in this very moment, 
the negotiations going on in the background aim at the approval [of 
the agreement]. There is a new proposal, which takes some of [the 
EP’s] objections into account. But the EP lets itself get under 
pressure and there will be an arrangement today or on Monday. 
(GER-1) 
Indeed, the institutions have reached a compromise and the EP approved the SWIFT 
agreement by 484 to 109 on 8 July 2010. One condition was the creation of an own 
European tracking system mirroring the TFTP in order to avoid that large bulks of 
data are being sent to the US in the long run. Attention has faded since. The issue has 
hardly been debated in public – at least until the end of November 2010 as shown in 
Figure 1. Meanwhile, ‘the main problem persists, in that it has to stand up to the 
Council’ (GER-2). Other obstacles become especially apparent at times of economic 
recession which deeply affects the print media. ‘The less journalists you have here, 
the lower the reportage’ (GER-3). That is also partly why the seat in Strasbourg 
would be   
‘A tremendous waste of time, and money and effort. And it adds to 
the impression that the ‘so-called Parliament’ is a bit of a joke. If it 
is serious about reform, they should reform that.’ (UK-1) 
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Yet, the case study here demonstrates that when the Parliament has got the power to 
influence a highly salient decision at the EU level, it does indeed become serious 
enough to attract the public eye.  
‘SWIFT definitely got a lot of attention. It’s hard to say whether the 
EP receives more attention in general. In Strasbourg last week the 
press room was not that full. Months ago it was hard to find a place 
to sit down.’ (UK-3) 
The question is whether the EP ‘will be able to use the Lisbon treaty to push into its 
new limits of its powers’ (UK-1). Other significant areas, such as foreign policy given 
that the EP has sought to have a say over the budget of the External Action Service, 
the ‘supervision of economic governance’ (FRA-2), or Common Agricultural Policy 
which now is decided upon co-equally by the Council and the EP under the ordinary 
legislative procedure, are thus ‘worth to keep an eye on’ (UK-1). Yet, the increase in 
policy influence is not always appreciated: ‘It’s bad news for efficient policy making 
[as it] slows down and delays.’ (UK-2) 
‘The Parliament is revelling a lot at the moment by always referring 
to Lisbon. It makes a lot of noise. It is right to do that, of course. 
But it is too early to evaluate its influence.’ (GER-6) 
Nevertheless, as shown in the case of SWIFT, the treaty revisions bear the potential to 
enhance the European Parliament’s visibility in the European quality press, having 
shown little interest beforehand even when major issues were at stake (Baisnée 2003: 
96). This also enhances the chances to generate greater awareness of the European 
Parliament among EU citizens in the long run.  
 
The role of national parliaments 
The quantitative data thus far has demonstrated that we do not only find a variation 
over time, in that the EP receives significantly more media coverage after 1 December 
2009. Instead, the amount of coverage differs also across countries. Here, the news 
value of domesticity is a highly relevant criterion for the interpretation of the EP’s 
conduct with regards to the SWIFT case. For example, it would have been a ‘sensitive 
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issue’ in both Germany and the Netherlands as regards data protection (NL-2). In the 
Dutch case, personification also contributed to the media attention given the 
nationality of the main rapporteur, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert:  
‘It’s always very nationalistic of course. So, for us it’s interesting 
that the liberal Dutch MEP was quite active on SWIFT […] She was 
the leader of the move by the Parliament not to accept the deal. It 
was her moment of glory.’ (NL-1) 
A British correspondent provides another reason for why the domestic readership was 
interested in the EP’s rejection of the international agreement: ‘When it takes a 
decision that affects Brit… you know … Europe’s relations with the United States … 
That’s a big deal!’ (UK-1) That is to say that the public in the UK takes on another 
perspective given the close ties of the country with the US.  Yet, that does not explain 
the differences in the number of articles published (Table 1), let alone the net 
attention the EP receives as compared to other actors, institutions and decisions as 
demonstrated in Table 2.  
By employing regression models, the paper seeks to estimate whether the assumption 
holds which states that the way national parliaments would (be able to) exert 
influence on such an issue is reflected in the news coverage. Table 3 presents the 
Tobit regression models for the dependent variable that describes the percentage of 
words allocated to the European Parliament within each article. The standard errors 
are clustered by newspapers (here 17). As expected, the fact that the Lisbon Treaty 
has come into force increases the focus on the EP significantly by more than 40 
percentage points throughout models 1-5. Similarly, on days, or just after the EP held 
public debates in Strasbourg on the SWIFT case, the text devoted to that is prolonged 
by about 15%, controlling for the other factors of public opinion, EU Presidencies and 
newspaper characteristics. Incidentally, all of the latter effects are not statistically 
significant. However, the effect of the number of debates taking place concerning the 
SWIFT issue in the national parliament is significantly negative. That is to say that 
the more the national legislature got involved in the European deliberation process, 
the slightly less the respective articles deal with the position of the European 
Parliament (by about half a percentage point).  
[Table 3 about here] 
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However, the German newspapers bias the overall sample as they report comprehen-
sively about SWIFT and the European Parliament. Some, in fact, ‘promoted the issue 
from the beginning, regardless of the parliament’ (GER-5) Model 6 therefore, 
excludes the German newspaper articles, omitting the significant effect of 
parliamentary engagement at the national level. Similarly, Tables 4 and 5 provide a T-
test comparing the means of the independent variable by parliament strength after the 
Lisbon Treaty came into force. The results – the EP receives more attention in 
countries where rather weak parliaments form part of the political culture – are not 
significant once Germany is excluded from the analysis. This could also be due to the 
small sample size (N= 122). Nevertheless, the hypothesis about the reflection of the 
national parliament’s strength in the news coverage has to be rejected at this point. 
But the opposite is not necessarily true either. Instead, the analysis clearly 
demonstrates that the EP, once granted with greater rights, has become the master of 
the press reportage. In fact, national parliaments’ competences in the area of pure 
foreign affairs – as opposed to European affairs – rarely exceed the scope of 
international treaty ratifications (von Beyme, 1998). In countries where the legislature 
is rather weak per se, the EP’s take on the issue must have been welcomed for these 
reasons. It has stepped in where its national counterparts were not able to offer any 
public scrutiny. In contrast, newspapers in countries where stronger parliaments 
influence salient political issues, a sense of jealousy might have caused the lower 
coverage of the EP in the SWIFT case. Indeed, despite the formal acknowledgement 
of their participation in EU policy-making by the Lisbon Treaty, national parliaments 
might fear to lose out in the process of further European integration (cf. Maurer & 
Wessels, 2001) – they have yet to define their new role (Neunreither, 2005). Here, the 
German broadsheets are therefore not an outlier, but represent the best example. In 
fact, the opposition in the Bundestag explicitly demanded more influence in 
negotiating SWIFT agreement. The social democrat Gerold Reichenbach claimed 
publicly that the involvement of the German Parliament would be ‘absolutely 
essential’ following the increased responsibility through the Lisbon Treaty and the 
judgement by the German Constitutional Court in 2009 underlining the sovereignty of 
the Bundestag in EU affairs (Bundestag, 22/04/2010). 
Some correspondents indeed confirm the rivalry hypothesis by highlighting the 
(perceived) absence of some parliamentary competences at the EU level. A French 
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correspondent picks up on the ‘joke’ with which his British colleagues describe the 
European Parliament:  
‘For me, it is a ‘serious joke’. It is still improving, gaining powers, 
has some interesting MEPs and speakers, playing a real role, but 
sometimes not as serious as national parliaments, like the 
Bundestag, the House of Commons or Assemblée Nationale’ (FRA-2) 
This especially concerns the right of legislative initiative. The lack thereof would not 
render it a ‘fully-fledged parliament’ (GER1). However, the EP indirectly received 
this right with the Maastricht Treaty that has allowed the legislature to request the 
Commission to propose certain issues (Art. 138b). Furthermore, despite many 
national parliaments and their members holding de jure rights to introduce bills, de 
facto the intertwining of the majority and the government undermines this possibility 
with the executive normally taking the initiative in drafting legislation (Mattson, 
1995: 455). Zeh (2005) even criticises the German ‘Gesetzgebungsfunktion’ 
(emphasis added) as misleading as the Bundestag does not provide legislation itself 
but influences legislative formulation. Parliaments in Europe, including the one in the 
EU political system, are merely involved in the legislative process by devising and 
adopting legislation as well as by scrutinising the government’s proposals (see also 
Norton, 2004). This misperception of parliamentarism originates in the domestic 
political context and extends to the European level which leads the journalists to 
compare parliaments in terms of strengths. It, in fact, demonstrates that national 
parliaments serve as a measure of the European Parliament’s legitimacy for the 
European media as anticipated above.  
That is supposedly also why the European Parliament is being criticised for the lack 
of interplay between majority and opposition parties inside the parliament going as far 
as linking it to the democratic deficit: ‘I miss democracy in the Parliament to some 
extent – the democratic power games between majority and opposition, that happen 
far too seldom, far too seldom’ (GER-1) This underlines that the EU and especially 
the European Parliament would benefit in terms of public salience from more political 
contestation (Hix, 2008). However, institutional battles are sometimes inevitable 
given the setup of the EU political system in which the executive, comparably to 
presidential systems such as the US, does not evolve directly from the elected 
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parliamentary majority. While being distinct from the European parliamentary and 
semi-presidential democracies, these encounters, as we have seen above, can attract 
the press even if they are not appreciated as it would ‘paralyse the political culture’ 
(GER-2). Ironically, the Americans seem to have understood the European 
Parliament’s role in the SWIFT decision far better than their European counterparts 
since they have been lobbying the European Parliament considerably. In the European 
press the letters by Hillary Clinton, the Secretary of State and Timothy Geithner, 
Secretary of the Treasury, which were sent even before the EP’s vote in February, or 
the visit by Joe Biden have not resonated noticeably.  
 
Conclusions  
By pursuing a single yet crucial case study, the paper demonstrated that the EP, once 
having a say in a highly salient policy area and making use of that influence as in the 
case of SWIFT, is indeed able to stipulate public attention mediated by the European 
quality press. While this not necessarily holds for other policies and decisions taken 
by the EP, the research reveals a potential for more media coverage when relevant 
news values apply to the EP’s behaviour in the post-Lisbon era. Further research is 
required to evaluate this potential more comprehensively. Yet, the findings have 
positive implications for the democratic deficit debate as the media hold the important 
function of transmitting news and information to Europe’s citizens. Hence, their 
reportage could potentially lead to more public awareness of the EU and its 
representative body. Nevertheless, the paper also found variation in media reportage 
across country. The main reason for that was related to the engagement by national 
parliaments in the SWIFT debate. As exemplified by the German case, the stronger 
the respective legislature, the lower the news coverage about the EP suggesting a 
rivalry between parliamentary institutions at different levels in the mediated public 
sphere. It underlines the necessity of clearly defined roles in the EU decision-making 
process to evade any potential contention and instead enhance co-operation which the 
Lisbon Treaty prescribes by the ‘Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the 
European Union’. This is beyond the scope of this paper but provides food for thought 
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Table 1: Data overview 



















Irish Examiner centre-right 1 1 2 1  
Sunday Business Post business/financial 0 0 0 0 16 
The Guardian UK centre-left 2/1
a





The Times centre-right 1.5
b
 1 1 1  
Financial Times business/financial 4 1 11 8 27 
Le Monde FRA centre-left 4/3/2
 a





Le Figaro centre-right 2/1.5
ab
 1 7 2  
Les Echos business/financial 1 0 23 16 80 





Trouw centre-right 2 1 10 4  
NRC Handelsblad business/financial 2 1 12 16 49 
Sueddeutsche Zeitung GER centre-left 3/2
 a





FAZ centre-right 4 4 42 25  
Handelsblatt business/financial 3 1 57 23 210 





Salzburger Nachrichten centre-right 1 1 20 9  
WirtschaftsBlatt business/financial 1 1 5 0 73 
Total  17 288 167 455 
a
 The number of correspondents changed over time of the investigation (1 June 2006 – 30 November 2010), b 0.5 means that the staff is supported by a freelancer on location 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for dependent variable: Percentage of words about EP 
in article, by country 
 
Country Mean N 
Std. 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
IRE 20.019 16 25.57615 0 72.91 
UK 28.7811 27 35.80306 0 100 
FRA 30.1153 80 34.63982 0 100 
NL 24.415 49 28.62572 0 89.7 
GER 21.5226 210 26.89278 0 100 
AT 28.7144 73 30.71649 0 100 

















Table 3: Tobit models, with standard errors adjusted for 17 clusters in ‘newspaper’ 
(14 clusters in model 6); dependent variable: Percentage of words about EP in article 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Lisbon Treaty 42.0067*** 41.6308*** 41.3992*** 41.8333*** 42.4558*** 57.1988***   
6.7886 6.7618 6.67 6.7512 6.1295 3.5298 
SWIFT debate in EP 15.0317*** 15.0725*** 15.1135*** 15.0753*** 15.1524*** 13.3503**   
3.2049 3.3045 3.2794 3.3155 3.2333 5.6694 
No of SWIFT debates 
in NatParl 
-0.4498*** -0.5793*** -0.4786** -0.6108*** -0.6074*** -1.2606 
 0.1491 0.1878 0.2103 0.2182 0.1894 0.8832 
NP page size 0 0 0 0 0.0001 
 0 0 0 0 0.0001 
NP circulation 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
NP left -5.4914 -3.3959 -5.3941 -5.647 -0.6506 
3.8516 3.9747 3.7055 3.8487 4.8083 
NP right -0.8773 0.9724 -0.7487 -1.0982 6.6087 
2.6549 3.3828 3.0039 2.6071 4.8118 
EB trust in NatParl -0.2073              
0.1979             
EB support for EU 0.064              
 0.181             
EU Presidency 8.9214             
9.796             
Constant -5.7306 -0.7035 7.3875 -3.2773 -2.0091 -30.0223*** 
5.5647 7.6751 11.7166 11.0553 7.0885 9.9125 
Sigma constant 34.8306*** 34.7167*** 34.7144*** 34.7171*** 34.6711*** 35.2338***   
2.1978 2.2301 2.2545 2.226 2.2532 2.5923 
N 455 455 455 455 455 245 
Pseudo R Squared 0.0490 0.0496 0.0499 0.0497 0.0499 0.0739 
Country excluded - - - - - Germany 
 











Table 4: Independent sample t-test; t= 2.880 (equal variances assumed), df = 239 p = 0.004; Post-Lisbon sample, N= 241 
 
 
Dep. variable Classification N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
EP share % Countries with weak parliaments 60 48.7433 32.58609 4.20685 
 










Table 5: Independent sample t-test; t= 0.822 (equal variances assumed), df = 120 p = 0.413; Post-Lisbon sample, Germany excluded, N = 122 
 
Dep. variable Classification N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
EP share % Countries with weak parliaments 60 48.7433 32.58609 4.20685 
 Countries with strong parliaments  62 44.2169 28.15358 3.57551 
 
 
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics for relevant variables 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
EP share % 455 0 100 24.8766 29.78576 
No of Correspondents 455 1 4 2.3352 1.11076 
No of SWIFT debates in NatParl 455 0 22 11.9516 9.51916 
EB trust in NP 455 19 77 42.8242 10.10255 
EB support for EU membership 455 29 79 54.2154 11.59702 
NP circulation 455 38000 654000 233777.2549 1.30E+05 
NP page size  455 89760 218900 148903.9187 46077.10753 
Valid N (listwise) 455 
 
 
Table A.2: Frequencies for relevant variables 
 
Frequency Percent N 
SWIFT debate in EP 99 21.8 455.0 
Lisbon Treaty 241 53.0 455.0 




Table A.3: Bivariate correlations and p-value 
 
 
EP share % 




in EP Lisbon Treaty NP page size NP circulation 
No of 
Corresponde





EP share % 1 
          
            No of SWIFT debates 
in NatParl -0.1082 1 
         
 
0.021 
          SWIFT debate in EP 0.2895 0.0397 1 
        
 
0 0.3987 
         Lisbon Treaty 0.4976 0.0605 0.2942 1 
       
 
0 0.1977 0 
        NP page size -0.015 0.1743 -0.0016 -0.0185 1 
      
 
0.7504 0.0002 0.9734 0.6931 
       NP circulation 0.024 0.4576 0.0005 0.105 0.6109 1 
     
 
0.6096 0 0.992 0.0251 0 
      No of Correspondents -0.1302 0.6014 -0.0297 -0.0487 0.2722 0.3973 1 
    
 
0.0054 0 0.5278 0.2998 0 0 
     NP affiliation -0.0317 0.0834 0.0038 -0.0869 -0.2459 -0.4604 0.2075 1 
   
 
0.4999 0.0756 0.9357 0.064 0 0 0 
    EB trust in NP -0.0833 0.0995 0.0182 -0.0679 -0.039 -0.222 -0.2417 -0.0705 1 
  
 
0.0759 0.0339 0.6992 0.1481 0.4061 0 0 0.1331 
   EB support for EU -0.1238 0.3673 -0.0245 -0.1478 0.356 0.1837 0.1671 0.1167 0.2151 1 
 
 
0.0082 0 0.6019 0.0016 0 0.0001 0.0003 0.0127 0 
  EU Presidency -0.0945 0.0715 -0.0835 -0.2215 -0.1479 -0.0948 0.0261 0.0456 0.0537 -0.038 1 
 




Table A.4: Regression models, with standard errors adjusted for 17 clusters in 
‘newspaper’ (14 clusters in model 6); dependent variable: Percentage of words about 
EP in article 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Lisbon Treaty 42.0067*** 26.8883*** 26.8208*** 26.8975*** 27.4337*** 35.2377*** 
6.7886 3.3426 3.3643 3.3132 3.0034 2.8461 
SWIFT debate in EP 15.0317*** 11.6415*** 11.6551*** 11.6412*** 11.7159*** 10.7306** 
3.2049 2.7655 2.7547 2.7665 2.7183 4.7677 
No of SWIFT debates in 
NatParl 
-0.4498*** -0.6171*** -0.5956*** -0.6185*** -0.6358*** -0.5559 
0.1491 0.1221 0.1255 0.1395 0.124 0.5396 
NP page size  0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
NP circulation  0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
NP left -4.7329*** -4.2803** -4.7255** -4.9015*** -2.5537 
1.4925 1.7885 1.6292 1.499 2.6532 
NP right -0.0795 0.3085 -0.0708 -0.2807 2.9162 
1.5764 1.885 1.7281 1.5304 2.785 
EB trust in NatParl   -0.0479 
 0.126 
EB support for EU   0.0031 
 0.1021 
EU Presidency   5.9537 
4.5745 
Constant 13.1897*** 13.8852*** 15.7496** 13.7624** 12.9184*** -0.3064 
2.3352 3.6979 7.2599 5.097 3.3805 5.4347 
N 455 455 455 455 455 245 
R Squared 0.2855 0.2858 0.2844 0.2842 0.2857 0.3558 
 
Legend: b/se; * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
 
 
